Changing Trains

Public Opinion and the Negotiations Process

This from a letter by Ramadan Salih in Nicosia north in today's Turkish Daily News where the author suggests a way of incorporating the views of citizens into the negotiations process. An interesting suggestion which was attempted with some effect in Northern Ireland in the run up to the Good Friday Agreement:

If the common approach shared by both sides in Cyprus is to take up the Annan plan once more and bring about changes that would be acceptable to the majorities, then breaking down the number of "No" votes cast in the referenda with respect to different concerns of the people on both sides and prioritizing them for the purpose of defining and adjusting the dose of necessary changes to the Annan plan in line with common concerns to be expressed by both sides will be a realistic starting point.

The task of defining and breaking down different concerns can be undertaken by the mediators through the aid of a comprehensive public survey (questionnaire) that would demand from its subjects a prioritization of their concerns. Different concerns that spring to mind at first glance are: the degree of functionality, the degree of power sharing, the rigidity of property arrangements, the credibility of compensation arrangements, the degree of intermingling of people from the two sides and the credibility of the security arrangements. The list can be enlarged.

If, for example, the results of the public survey revel that a low degree of functionality is a real common concern for both sides, then it may seem that any change to the Annan plan to the effect of increasing its functionality will create a win-win situation. But given the fact that a federal system of governance, political equality and bi-zonality have been the three agreed fundamental parameters since 1977, one should come to the understanding that any change to the Annan plan should exclude a deviation towards a unitary state (which can also bring about functionality) because a unitary state highly excludes all of the three agreed fundamental parameters, whereas achieving a higher degree of functionality through a deviation towards a looser federation seems to be a more viable and acceptable alternative because this can better accommodate the three parameters.

'Bargaining Over What Turkey Needs'

George Lordos presents his opinion here:

TWO DEMANDS of the Turkish side, that often become the object of great confusion by the mass media, are:
(1) The derogations from the acquis communautaire should be permanent in nature,
(2) The agreement should be part of EU primary law, otherwise the agreement will be vulnerable to lawsuits in European Courts.

Regarding the first point, it is of course a major issue in the negotiations. Our position, and Europe’s position, is that there should be no permanent derogations on basic principles, but only temporary derogations where absolutely necessary. If our view prevails, given that the referee role of the UN is already in full swing, one day the acquis communautaire shall fully apply in Cyprus – a point that is rightly a “red line” for Greek Cypriot voters who will be called on to approve or reject the deal. We await the results of the negotiations on this first point.

Regarding the second point, that the agreement should become part of EU primary law, the matter is less political and more technical, provided always that the content of the solution itself is genuinely acceptable as a compromise. Primary law in Europe – the superior law that trumps all other laws – consists of Treaties between sovereign states. For instance, Maastricht, Schengen, and the Treaty of Accession signed in Athens on April 16, 2003, whereby Cyprus became a full member of the EU Below the Treaties, the next layer of the EU legal system consists of community law created by decisions of the ECJ and ECHR. Constitutions of individual member states, such as the constitution contained in the Annan Plan, occupy the third layer, below the first two. Turkey is asking that any agreement reached should be part of EU primary law, so that there is no risk that provisions of the agreement can be overturned in European Courts through private lawsuits.

In other words, Turkey is asking for guarantees that we will “keep our word”, so that she will agree to a negotiated compromise solution. Turkey argues that it is in nobody’s interest, having reached and implemented a negotiated solution, to have that solution not stand up in European Courts.

Should we give these guarantees without receiving something else in return? Of course not. This problem did not exist before the signature of the Treaty of Accession in Athens, and therefore it was created because Turkey and Denktash caused the collapse of the previous settlement opportunities in Copenhagen and in the Hague. However, Turkey is now in a much weaker bargaining position because she does not have the luxury to torpedo the process she started without shooting herself in the foot, and thus she must pay for this mistake at the bargaining table. The intermediaries, who are focused on a double ‘yes’ at the referenda, know this.

Turkey and Denktash brought this problem upon themselves and they must offer us something in order to be rid of this problem. By demanding guarantees of performance of our obligations under the agreement, Turkey is strengthening our arguments for effective guarantees of the performance of her obligations in return. For instance, we need effective guarantees that the areas subject to territorial adjustment will be returned according to the agreed timetable, that the Turkish troops will leave, and that there will be no future flow of settlers or illegal immigrants from Turkey. I believe, and I hope, that we are using Turkey’s demands on the second point to argue and negotiate far more convincingly for these guarantees that are important to us in Lucerne.

The Negotiations in Switzeland - Commentators Views

The Aljazeera news channel carries some interesting observations from a variety of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot sourses about the negotiations taking place in Switzeland. Available here:

..."I'm optimistic a solution can be found," says Greek columnist and commentator Evangelos Arteos. "But I'm pessimistic about what happens after that."..."I'm optimistic because the process built into the Annan Plan is a smooth one," says Turkish commentator Fehmi Koru of the newspaper Yeni Safak, known to be close to the Ankara government. "Once the negotiating process has started, it can’t be stopped."

Turkish Foreign Minister Abd Allah Gul and Greek Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis are to try and fill in the many blanks left by the first round, before Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan and Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis arrive on 28 March to give another push for settlement.

If the four parties agree, then the settlement will be put to a referendum, held simultaneously on both sides of the island's divide on 20 April.

However, if no agreement is finalised, or if there are still points of contention, Annan himself will move to write the deal which will be put to the voters.

"What people here are saying now is wait for the outcome of the Swiss talks, and let’s see the final text," says Ozdil Nami, of the Turkish Cypriot Businessmen’s Association and a deputy for the largest Turkish Cypriot party, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP)...."There's a lot of concern here about two issues," Nami continues. "The first is the property issue, the second, cementing political equality in the new, reunited Cyprus between Turkish and Greek Cypriots."

Property is a great concern because following the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974, many thousands of Greek Cypriots fled their homes in the northern part of the island, which became de facto Turkish Cypriot territory. Likewise, thousands of Turkish Cypriots also fled their homes in the southern, Greek Cypriot dominated part of the island. "Property will be a very difficult issue to solve," warns Namil. "After 1974 too, Greek Cypriot land was sometimes given to settlers from Turkey, who then sold it on to others. What happens to the people now on that land isn’t clear."...

"The Turkish Cypriot side has always favoured a global exchange on this issue," adds Namil. "We always said we would compensate for loss of property and land. We will simply have to find the money to pay the Greek Cypriots for this." But it is not clear where this money will come from. "The US and the EU always in the past said they would sort this out, but now we feel they are backing off a little. This is making people here a bit uncomfortable."

Another major issue is that of "derogations". "The main point on the Greek side is the derogations," says Arteos. "This is the point that worries Greece and the Greek Cypriots the most."

The problem is that Cyprus is due to join the European Union on 1 May this year. When it does, it will be subject to EU law, which includes the right to move freely within EU territory and to own property. However, under the Annan Plan, the number of Greek Cypriots who would be allowed to move back to areas now under Turkish Cypriot control has been limited. This contradiction between EU law and the agreement opens the agreement to legal challenges at some future date. "This is a major problem for Turkey," adds Koru. "The EU must give assurances that the agreement can't be changed later."

Turkish Cypriots, who number only around a fifth of the island's population, are concerned that the areas of the island earmarked under the plan to contain Turkish Cypriot majorities will gradually come back under Greek Cypriot control if they are all allowed to move back.

Underlying all these issues though is perhaps most importantly, the question of trust – or a lack of it. "Even if the sides reach an agreement and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots vote yes in the referendum, the problem will not be over," warns Arteos. "The plan needs good will to work, but there is no good will."

Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas has pulled out of the second phase of talks, as he is against the Annan Plan. Meanwhile, Papadopoulos is also not known for his support of the initiative. "They are both leaders from the old school," says Arteos. Denktas has been involved in Turkish Cypriot nationalist politics since the 1950s, while Papadopolous too has a decades-long pedigree of nationalist activism.

"Under the Annan plan, Papadopoulos may become president of a reunited Cyprus, with Denktas vice president. Yet, how can these two possibly work together?" says Arteos. It is a worry now beginning to be voiced on both sides of Europe’s last divided nation.

An Open Letter to Kofi Annan

A regular contributer to this site, Yiouli Taki, has this open letter warning about a potential 'trade off' in the current negotiations processwhich would harm the spirit of the Annan Plan. Available here:

Sir,
The principle merits of the Foundation Agreement (FA) arise from the ingenuity with which it addresses the substantial demands and needs of each side, while at the same time breaking from the strong ethnic determinations that guided the 1960 constitution. This achievement is largely dependent on the provision relating to the exercise of political rights, as well as that which leaves the choice of granting internal citizenship status to the constituent states. This, I have understood so far, is a deliberate effort to avoid incorporating provisions in the FA that lock the right to representation and the notion of internal citizenship to one’s ethnic identity. As is generally expected, a modern Constitution should not be tying citizenship and national identity together.

This seems both right and necessary in the present circumstances. Distinct from the situation in 1960, both communities will now be equipped with their own constituent state. However, states have responsibilities – and so should the constituent states in Cyprus. Long transitional arrangements provide the communities with enough space to establish constituent states that can endure even in the presence of members of the other community on their territory, an outcome achieved by gaining their loyalty.
In the last few weeks, it has been consistently ‘rumoured’ that among the revisions that your team is considering for the final version of the FA is one that relates to the exercise of political rights. Even more disturbing is the fact that – as the rumour goes – the Greek Cypriot side would be prepared to trade this issue off for either more land or an increase in the percentage of Greek Cypriots that would be permitted to take permanent residence in the Turkish Cypriot State.

According to these reports, consideration is being given to a situation within which in both federal elections and in constituent state elections, Cypriots will be voting according to their internal citizenship status. The Turkish Cypriot State (and maybe the Greek Cypriot State too) will opt to utilise section 2 par. 3 of the Constitutional Law On Internal Constituent State Citizenship Status And Constituent State Residency Rights in order to ensure that Greek Cypriots taking permanent residence on its territory will not be able to be voted in as representatives of the Turkish Cypriot State at the federal institutions. By revising section 3 of the same attachment in a way that makes the exercise of political rights at all levels (including that of the local and constituent state elections) dependent on internal citizenship status, the balance established in the third version of the Plan is severely disturbed.

Such a revision would be a significant and potentially dangerous blow to the right to representation of all those Cypriots who will opt to take permanent residence in the territory of the other state. This dangerous precedent would be compounded further since it would also remove any commitment that candidates running for the constituent state parliamentary elections would otherwise have towards that part of the population that does not hold the internal citizenship status of the concerned state. In this way it would remove therefore any incentive mechanism for due accountability between politicians and the minorities concerned and would turn members of the latter group into second class citizens of Cyprus.

The prospect of denying Cypriot citizens the right to participate in the determination of the daily affairs and practices of the constituent state in whose territory they reside disturbs the balance between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot demands and other overarching principles that need to be respected. A provision which states that permanent residents of one constituent state would be voting for representatives who possess powers only in relation to the daily affairs of the other constituent states creates a significant ‘democratic deficit’. As an outcome it would have the effect of entrenching the closed communal identities directly through the UCR Constitution.

I urge your team to reconsider this issue with urgency and come up with alternative answers to Turkish Cypriot demands.
Yours faithfully,
Yiouli Taki

'Don’t Disrupt Greece’s Juggling Act' - George Lordos

George Lordos argues here that, that Greece is engaged in a delicate mission to resolve the 'Cyprus Problem':

WHATEVER the decision, which is now less than a month away, things will be very different on the day after. Not only is the coming change scary in itself, but we treat the interest of foreigners with suspicion. This is quite understandable for a small island that is parked at the crossroads of three continents and which has attracted the self-interested attentions of powerful foreigners for centuries.

However, I don’t believe there is a single Greek Cypriot who would question the good intentions of Greece. Greek leaders such as Prime Ministers Simitis and Karamanlis, and Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Molyviatis have publicly declared many times that the goal is a solution through the current UN process by May 1. If there was a great conspiracy to force a bad solution down our throats at all costs no later than May 1 (presumably, as Nicos Koutsou would have us believe, because on May 2 we will instantly become a legalistic superpower that can kick Turkey out of Cyprus merely by burying it under tons of paper in the European Court of Human Rights), why isn’t Greece doing something to stop this dastardly plan? Why, instead, did Greek and Turkish officials meet and have already made some progress on the security issues? Why did Karamanlis himself announce last Thursday that he would personally participate in the second phase starting from March 28? Is there a single Greek Cypriot who is seriously accusing the government of Greece of being either incompetent or part of a conspiracy to legitimise the fait accompli of the invasion with a bad solution?

I don’t know about you, but personally, if I had to choose between trusting Greece and trusting the likes of Mr Koutsou and Mr Perdikis (the extremist leaders of two fringe parties that together amount to less than 3 per cent of the population, whose vision for Cyprus amounts to staying as we are and hoping for the best, who are insinuating that the pressure to solve it by May 1 is a satanic conspiracy by our enemies and who are rejecting the solution without even waiting to read the final text), I would definitely pay more attention to what the Greek government has to say.

Greece’s visionary strategy of constructive engagement with Turkey, which encountered severe resistance and ridicule at first, has already delivered spectacular results including Turkey’s complete U-turn over Cyprus: whereas former PM Bulent Ecevit still insists that the Cyprus problem was solved in 1974, Tayyip Erdogan says that no solution is not a solution. And here we are today, much closer to a solution than we have ever been.

Greece did not help Cyprus to enter the EU so that 600,000 Greek Cypriots would turn around and become an obstacle in the implementation of the national strategy of constructive engagement chosen by 11,000,000 Greeks. We should, therefore, give due consideration as to how our vision for Cyprus takes full advantage of the Greek national strategy, in a way that is for the mutual benefit of Greece and Cyprus.

The Annan Plan should not be accepted “as is” primarily because it might lead to a suicidal transitional co-Presidency with Denktash and, to a lesser extent, because not enough thought had been given to the economics of the solution. However, I am confident that the final document that will be produced by the end of March will be improved in both of these areas, and in other areas as well. My confidence stems from the fact that Turkey, given its reasons for starting this process in the first place, has no power to walk away from these negotiations, the Turkish Cypriots are virtually certain to return a ‘yes’ no matter what, whereas a ‘yes’ from the Greek side is far from certain. The mediators who want to see a double ‘yes’ will therefore naturally have to listen very carefully to our concerns, which are valid and serious and the plan will be improved.

The urgency for a viable compromise now is easy to explain. To have a solution, Turkey must want it too. For the first time since 1974, Turkey really wants it, because it is facing an uphill struggle to receive the golden date from the EU. The Cyprus problem will be the pretext for those Europeans who are sceptical. However, if on April 20 a Greek ‘no’ is matched by a Turkish ‘yes’, there is no reasonable way that Cyprus can continue to be the pretext. Therefore, whether Turkey gets the date or not, she will lose interest in Cyprus until (and if ever) it is time for her accession in 10-15 years from now. Erdogan’s attention will turn to the top items of his agenda (the EU, Kurds, Iraq), the Cyprus problem will go back into a long hibernation and the north could turn into a second Taiwan.

In the 30 years since 1974, an estimated 37,000 Greek Cypriot refugees have died, 80,000-100,000 settlers from Anatolia live, marry and give birth in the north, and about 20,000-40,000 Turkish Cypriots have emigrated. Are we going to hold out for the perfect solution until all the refugees are dead, all the Turkish Cypriots are gone, and virtually the whole population in the north consists of settlers from Anatolia and their descendants?

A thousand years from now there will still be Greeks in Greece and Cyprus, and Turks in Turkey and Cyprus, and we will all still be situated in the same eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. One day we will have to leave the past behind us and learn how to be good partners and good neighbours. Fortunately, this process will not take a thousand years. The solution of the Cyprus problem will be a decades-long political process, not a 1,000 page legalistic contract that has to be perfect before we sign it.

Thus, the improved Annan Plan that we will be voting on come April 20 will be the beginning of the solution, not the end. On almost all everyday matters, each constituent state will have autonomy, yet we will speak with one voice in the EU, providing a setting for the evolution of co-operation without the friction that characterised the period from 1960-1963. Slowly, politicians and people from both sides will start trusting each other, expanding our co-operation wherever it makes sense. This is constructive engagement in practice – the current Greek and Turkish national strategy. I hope that the Annan Plan is improved enough so we can safely accept it, and so we can make constructive engagement the Cypriot national strategy too, for the benefit of our country and our children. We are all long overdue for a peace dividend in our small corner of the world.

Put Pressure on Papadopoulos'

So says the Cyprus Mail in an editorial available here:

BEFORE going to New York last month to discuss the resumption of the peace process, President Papadopoulos and his advisors maintained that nothing would be agreed as Turkey’s interest in a settlement was nothing more than a “communications game”. His spokesman and advisors continued to propagate this claim while in New York, long after it had become apparent to everyone else that Turkey meant business, and even after the signing of the agreement that set into motion the peace procedure that will end with the holding of separate referenda on a settlement.

In fact, the only “communications game” in town has been the one being played by Papadopoulos, who has been paying lip service to the need for a solution while all his actions are aimed at preventing it from happening. He started his own “communications game” with the letter sent to Kofi Annan in December, urging him to call negotiations so that a solution could be found before May 1. Yet in New York, Papadopoulos initially rejected Annan’s proposed procedure and only agreed to it under intense pressure from the US and the EU. On his return to the island, he admitted that tough negotiations lay ahead but vowed to work day and night in order to secure the improvements that would make the Annan plan workable.

Whether he has kept this promise is questionable. According to the Turkish side, he has been reluctant to negotiate the proposals he has made at the meetings with Alvaro de Soto, a view that is shared by foreign diplomats in the know. This failure to work on improvements on the Annan plan is perfectly in line with the government’s thinly-veiled policy of building mass popular opposition to the proposed settlement, with the ultimate objective of a ‘no-vote’ in the referendum. Why would he want to make it workable if his wish is for people to reject it?

There is little doubt that this is what the government has been working on ever since the president’s return from New York. Papadopoulos’ closest associates, all the leading members of his party DIKO and the pro-government media have been engaging in an unrelenting campaign against the Annan plan, the acceptance of which, they claim with one voice, would be a total disaster; none of them has identified a single positive element in the plan worth talking about. Even the president’s closest aide and member of his negotiating team, Tassos Djionis, a civil servant, felt obliged to join in the public campaign of rubbishing the plan.

Government ministers are also part of the campaign. The commerce minister announced that a solution would be disastrous for the tourism industry while the finance minister warned that the economy would collapse under the strain of the economic demands of a settlement. And when a Planning Bureau study about the costs of a solution, featuring astronomical amounts, was leaked, the finance minister said nothing. Ten days later, after everyone had been adequately alarmed about the cost of a solution, he deemed it necessary to explain that the figures in the study did not represent the cost of a settlement and it was all a misunderstanding.

The government’s anti-solution campaign continued this week, when it took an informal document submitted by the UN about the agenda of the negotiations, and, through leaks to the media, tried to use it to turn public opinion against Alvaro de Soto’s team. The document was one-sided, addressing only the concerns of the Turkish side, insisted the foreign minister and the state broadcaster. Two days later, after enough missiles had been fired against the pro-Turkish mediators, Papadopoulos decided to say that the fuss was unjustified.

Until now, many people gave Papadopoulos the benefit of the doubt, arguing that he was doing all this in order to secure a better deal, but not any more. It has become abundantly clear that his objective is to scupper a possible deal at the referendum. And he has trapped the party leaders who support a settlement with his clever scheming. They had offered him full and unqualified support, in order to improve the plan, but he has used this support to pursue his own agenda, while creating the impression among the public that all his actions are endorsed by the party leaders, something which is not true. The party leaders are reluctant to undermine him at this point by questioning his handling of issues, but they need to act decisively.

The National Council should insist that Papadopoulos is accompanied by another party leader – Christofias or Anastassiades – or by former president Clerides in the new round of negotiations, because it would be a great shame if another week was allowed to go by without the president making any real attempt to secure improvements in the plan because it does not serve his ultimate aim. Four weeks of talks have been wasted on bickering about procedural matters and Rauf Denktash was not the only party to blame for this, as the government has been claiming.

The peace procedure moves to Switzerland this week as it enters its final and most critical phase. The National Council should make sure Papadopoulos puts aside his silly communications games and concentrates on fulfilling his promise of improving the Annan plan. He will have to abandon the silly games when the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey enter the fray next Sunday, but it might be too late to salvage anything by then.

'Papadopolous Helping Dentash Achieve His Objectives'

This from the Greek Cypriot columnist Loucas Charalambous, available here:

THIS COLUMN did not have to see the president’s top advisor and right hand man, Tasos Djionis, expounding his negative views about the Annan plan on television to understand the devious political game being played by Tassos Papadopoulos in order to avoid a settlement. Even before his election this column had been pointing out that he remained the man he had been in the Eighties. We had argued that some things never change, no matter how hard we may try to achieve this. Hard-line rejectionism, for this man, is not just a figure of speech. It is a way of life. It is the foundation on which he has built his political career.

With all the things happening, nobody can be justified in having any doubts about the president’s real intentions. The game he is playing is pretty obvious. First, he made sure he terrified everyone by presenting the plan as something akin to the plague. His critical comments, which culminated, last summer, in his description of the plan as the “legitimisation of the invasion”, have been well-documented. Then he gave assistance to Rauf Denktash, in the elections in the north, by letting the Turkish Cypriots know that, even if their leader had accepted the Annan plan in The Hague, he would not have signed it.

In New York last month, Turkey’s unexpected change of stance on Cyprus messed up his plans and designs. He was forced to sign the deal stipulating negotiations, the resolution of differences by the UN Secretary-general and the holding of separate referenda. And now, he keeps making public pronouncements, on a daily basis, about Rauf Denktash’s inflexible attitude at the negotiations, in order to stir up public anger and resentment. Essentially, he is helping Denktash achieve his objective, which is no different from his own – to antagonise the Greek Cypriots into rejecting the settlement in the referendum.

In addition to his personal contribution to this rejectionist campaign, Papadopoulos has recruited the help of a number of his subordinates, such as Djionis and most of his party’s deputies, including Fyttis, Kleanthous, Angelides etc. I cannot think anyone is stupid enough to swallow the ludicrous claim that these people are supposedly expressing their personal opinions when they are railing against the plan.

Papadopoulos must have a very low regard of people’s intelligence if he genuinely thought that they would have actually believed that Djionis, his subordinate and chief advisor at the negotiations, would have dared to indulge in such an unrelenting polemic against the plan on television, without not only the president’s consent but his express orders. DIKO’s deputy leader Nikos Kleanthous would not have been celebrating about the findings of the opinion polls (showing that the majority of people were opposed to the plan) if he did not have direct instructions to do so from the president.

In this way, more or less, we will arrive at the referendum and the disastrous plan would still be considered disastrous. In such a climate people would reject the plan, without Papadopoulos having to, publicly, urge them to do so. Thus, the president will have realised his objective and blame the rejection of the plan on the will of the people. This is why I have described Papadopoulos’ game as devious. We are witnessing a classic example of political duplicity. On the one hand, he signed the agreement in New York and has been going to negotiations, at which he is, supposedly, working hard in order to secure a deal, while, on the other hand, he is making sure that people are terrified of a solution and creating the conditions that would make them vote ‘no’ in a referendum.

Of course, neither he nor his flunkeys have bothered to explain to people the devastating consequences of a Turkish Cypriot ‘yes’ and Greek Cypriot ‘no’ in the April referenda. The Turkish occupation army would stay in Cyprus indefinitely, Famagusta, Morphou etc would be lost forever, refugees will never get their properties back, and we will have two separate states on the island -- the boundaries of which would be today’s dividing line.

The most infuriatingly provocative aspect of this game is not Papadopoulos’ strident opposition to a settlement, which, after all, he had always embraced. It is his hypocrisy. If he did not want a solution why did he agree to the UN-proposed procedure when he was in New York? And as he made a complete mess of things in New York, he should have had the guts to get up and tell people, like a man, that he disagreed with the procedure and would not be attending negotiations. At least that way he would not have to orchestrate this pathetic farce.

Futher Greek Cypriot Reaction to the Election of Karamanlis

An op-ed in the Greek Cypriot paper Phileleftheros, avialable here, is one of the more interesting responses to the significance of a change in goverment in Greece and the impact this might have here:

...With the exception of a small number of people, who tend to remember from time to time the “zeibekiko of shame” –as they care to call the dance of George Papandreou in front of Ismael Gem so as to label the former as “submissive” (which is the mildest characterization addressed to Mr. Papandreou)– the vast majority of the Cypriots has been secretly hoping that the Gallup poll would be reversed and that PASOK would remain as the head of Greece during this crucial phase of the Cyprus issue; because PASOK was or seemed to be more consistent towards Cyprus than New Democracy.

The past of the New Democracy party and its founder in relation to the political problem of Cyprus is not so ideal in the eyes of the Cypriots –justly or unjustly has little importance. As it was pointed out very rightly yesterday by my colleague Androula Taramounta in this column “the party and the family of Karamanlis” is hounded by the Cyprus syndrome. The late Karamanlis was the one that stated that Cyprus was far away and Ioannis Varvitsiotes, the ex Defence Minister of Greece, was the one who said that Greece was not going to send its children so that they would become trapped in Cyprus. Certainly, many members of the party disagreed with that statement and Mr. Varvitsiotes offered explanations afterwards, however the impression lingered.

In addition, there is also the president of New Democracy himself. When Greece and Cyprus achieved the Helsinki decision in December 1999 (that opened the road to Cyprus’ accession) – the whole effort was initiated by Kranidiotis-Papandreou-Simitis – Mr. Karamanlis at the time criticized the Greek government. He, in fact, said that it was a compromise in favour of Ankara. Later on, Mr. Karamanlis set the record straight or tried to do so.

In conclusion, the skepticism is totally justified – perhaps even the phobia – on the part of the Cypriots regarding the prevalence of New Democracy. It is up to Mr. Karamanlis and his collaborators to succeed in reversing this negative climate.

Dentash Sees a Solution as 'Inevitable'

The Turkish Daily News editorialise here about the current state of play and focuses on the relationship between Turkey and Dentash:

The Turkish government sees very clearly that the past negative attitude of the Turks has backfired and has led to the portrayal of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots as villains in the international arena. It also sees that the international community and especially the western powers are now determined to solve this problem and whoever stands in their way will be punished.

So Denktas, who has displayed a negative attitude in the past, has been forced to mellow as the Ankara government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan has displayed a strong political will to appcase (sic) the international community and help solve the Cyprus problem.

So far, so orthodox as a general reading of the situation. Yet the editorial goes on to make this intriguing assertion:

But in Ankara Denktas and his followers are making a last ditch effort. Denktas has already told people privately that he sees a solution imposed by the western powers as inevitable by May 1 and thus nothing he does can prevent this.

Difficult to judge the status of this claim but it makes for interesting reading nonetheless. The editorial then concludes:

He knows that if he pulls out of the negotiations Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat will take over as negotiator and finish off the deal. So he cannot afford to leave the stage and lose the initiative. So Denktas comes to Ankara, makes threats, warns Erdogan he can be as intransigent as before and then leaves. The chess game in Cyprus continues. Denktas is being Denktas but the peace process is taking its own natural course thanks to Ankara displaying the strong political will to defy the intransigent lobbies.

Dentash the Maximalist - Talat on the Rise

Following on from yesterday’s post relating to Dentash’s Ankara trip, his speech to the Chamber of Commerce there and his apparent change of mood, Mehmet Ali Birand has his own observations to make.

Birand believes his bellicose speech, in which he stated quite clearly that if the results of the negotiations process did not satisfy certain sine qua nons (basic conditions) then he would initiate a "'No' to agreement" campaign, was primarily intended to put pressure on both the UN and Ankara and ‘get the most he can.’

Birand also comments on the rally which greeted Dentash:

To tell you the truth, his rally on Thursday was not that exciting. It seemed more like an anti-Justice and Development (AK Party) rally rather than one in support of the KKTC. Even that did not generate too much support. The political party leaders, the Ottoman military marching band seemed like a scene from the old Turkey. It failed to initiate anything but signaled that debates in the coming weeks would be more heated.

Finally, he observes:

….Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat's standing and prestige is constantly rising. During his years in the opposition, his statements were different from those we were used to hearing from other politicians. He sometimes criticized Ankara's policies, which would not have been welcomed by some. He always supported a solution. He did not shrink from meeting with the Greek Cypriots. The military and the Foreign Ministry described him as a "traitor." The people decided and made him the prime minister.

Everybody was wondering how Talat would behave at this critical juncture. How would his relations with Denktas be? Would he continue to follow his past policies? Reservations about him were proved to be without merit. Talat behaved respectfully towards Denktas. His policies are balanced and his announcements reflect a knowledgeable statesman. People say he has been very constructive during the negotiations.

He may have always been like this. Either we were unaware, or he changed his attitude; however, no matter what happens, Talat is considered one of the shining young lights of Turkish Cypriots politicians.

In the current edition of the Cyprus Weeky Kutlay Erk, who is the Mayor of Nicosia (North), and is a leading member of Talat's Republican Turkish Party’s appears to confirm elements of Birand's analysis. Erk:
.

..justified Rauf Dentash’s bid “to bargain with a maximalist approach” even though his controversial proposals last week were well outside of the parameters of the Annan Plan.

“I’m sure the parties are trying to bargain with a maximum this approach because this is the last bargaining, whatever they receive they will receive at this stage…I can justify the approach of producing maximalist demands,” he said. “But proposals do not mean acceptance. The philosophy of the Annan Plan during negotiations safeguards that the maximalist approach of the parties will become reasonable at the end of negotiations…they are still negotiating, this is something very good,” he added.