Originally published in the Lebonese 'The Daily Star'. The writer, Philip Robins, is a lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of St. Antony's College. He is the author of Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War. Also available here:
With simultaneous referendums scheduled for each side of the island of Cyprus on April 24, the drama of the UN-sponsored Cyprus peace process has seemingly entered its final phase. While there is still much to play for as the respective campaigns get underway, there is no doubt about who has already emerged as the main winner: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) government.Whatever the various permutations of the votes, Erdogan has succeeded in neutralizing a perennial obstacle to Turkey's aspirations for European Union membership. Moreover, he has taken on and faced down the "deep state" (Turkey's equivalent of the intelligence services-run state) on the issue closest to its heart. The prospects for Erdogan and the AKP, post-Islamists in an increasingly post-Kemalist Turkey, have never looked better.
Initially, the position of the Turkish side toward Cyprus seemed impossible. The leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktash, had over the years come to be identified by the international community as the main obstacle to a Cyprus solution based on some form of political reunification. For Denktash, suspicious of the Greeks and cosseted in his own fiefdom, there was little incentive to deal. In this the Turkish political establishment, notably the military and the "old guard" in the Foreign Ministry, had repeatedly indulged him.
For Erdogan and his team, however, the solution was simple: Take the Cyprus issue that had come to symbolize all that was narrow-minded, uncooperative and hectoring about Turkish diplomacy and transform it into an eye-catching high point. In the way the situation was turned around, one is reminded of the about-face executed by former Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis toward Turkey in 1999. Athens replaced enmity with strategic friendship and Greek-Turkish relations have been cordial ever since.
There were three steps to Erdogan's new departure on Cyprus. First, following the AKP's sweeping electoral victory in November 2002, he indicated that a Cyprus solution was to be a priority of the new government. Second, he kept his powder dry through much of 2003, waiting until the general election in the northern part of the island last December led to the replacement of the rejectionist government of Dervis Eroglu by the pro-settlement party of Mehmet Ali Talat. Third, he declared, in the spirit of the energized diplomacy characterizing Turkey since the turn of the year, that Ankara would be at the forefront of political cooperation.
Since December, Ankara has unswervingly stuck to this strategy. It backed the resumption of the Cyprus peace process with a relaunched plan by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York on Feb. 13. It neutralized hard-liners at home with a combination of liberal institutional reform and the weight of its electoral mandate, re-emphasized by its sweeping victory in local elections in Turkey on March 28. It supported the sequential negotiation of the plan's substance through talks between the North and South, supplemented by the involvement of Ankara and Athens at Buergenstock in Switzerland. And now, with Annan having famously "filled in the gaps" left outstanding following these negotiations, the Erdogan government has forcefully committed itself to campaigning for a "yes" vote in the North.
With the likes of such popular and respected leaders as Erdogan and Talat in the "yes" camp, it is being widely predicted that the Turkish Cypriots will respond positively to the final version of the Annan plan. However, with Denktash and the opposition Republican People's Party in Turkey actively campaigning against, nothing can be taken for granted.
The main arguments of the rejectionists are two: First, that at 9,000 pages, including its annexes, the draft is too long and dense to be assimilated and discussed during such a brief period before the vote. Second, that the EU derogations on freedom of movement that are intrinsic to the bi-zonal, bi-communal nature of the agreement will not prove enduring because they are not to be included in the EU's primary law.
More darkly, Denktash and some of his supporters have predicted that the plan creates a context in which the island will eventually succumb to intercommunal conflict. In view of the backdrop of ethnic violence that blighted Cyprus between 1963 and 1974, even a single incident, real or contrived, at this most delicate of times could tip the scales against the proposal.
That in a way is no longer the main issue, especially if, as seems probable, the Greek Cypriots consider the plan to be several concessions too far and vote it down. In the main procedural flaw of the process, the government of Cyprus representing the Greek part of the island will accede to full membership of the EU on May 1, regardless of the outcome of the referendums. Like the Irish in their two referendums on the EU's Nice treaty, it may well take the Greek Cypriots a couple of plebiscites to come to terms with the new realities of the eastern Mediterranean.
The main outcome of the whole Cyprus peace process is that no one will be able to say it was Turkey that blocked a settlement. This means the Cyprus issue, which has arguably been the single most outstanding threat to converging relations between the EU and Turkey, may be neutralized. Moreover, if the outcome of the referendums really is a "yes and no," it will be difficult for the EU to retain its wide-ranging embargo on the North of the island. Indeed, some Europeans have even spoken of recognition for the Turkish entity.
Such a scenario makes it far more likely that in the crucial EU summit this December. Turkey will be given the long coveted date for the commencement of its accession negotiations with Europe. The desperation of the EU in the wake of the harrowing Madrid bombings to demonstrate publicly that it can work in partnership with the Muslim world is Turkey's second trump card. Should it receive a date in December, Turkey's EU membership will simply be a matter of time.
Inside Turkey, the second main outcome of the Cyprus peace process has been a public demonstration that it is the elected government, rather than the military, that now drives policy. The once mighty National Security Council, meeting at the beginning of this month to consider the Annan Plan, acknowledged this by saying that acceptance of the arrangement was a matter for the government. The fact that the military, with 30,000 troops in Cyprus and much of its prestige at home derived from the 1974 invasion, has not been uncooperative on the matter indicates just how times are changing. An accession date for Turkey in December will further tilt the balance in favor of the government.
Cyprus has long been the chosen litmus test by which state forces in Turkey demonstrated their potency. This explains its disproportionate importance in Turkish foreign policy, alongside altogether more obviously substantive issues such as Europe and NATO. In facing down these shadowy state forces on their own ground, it is the AKP government that has on this occasion passed the test.